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But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word “red” 
and what he is to do with the word “five?” – Well, I assume that he 
acts as I have described.  Explanations come to an end somewhere. 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §1) 
 
1. Introduction: A Paradigm of Knowing 
 What does it mean to know?  René Descartes’s Meditations offers an 
enduring and profoundly influential answer to this question.  In this work, he 
provides a vision of knowledge which entails that clarity, distinctness, and 
certainty are the necessary attributes which constitute knowing.  Generally science 
has adopted these criteria in its pursuit of fact and truth; one could equally say it is 
how the distinctions between opinion, faith, and knowledge are commonly 
understood.  The profundity and influence of Descartes’s vision should not, 
however, mask the avalanche of negative responses developed in relation to it.1  
                                                 
1 These responses are extraordinarily varied and I will only mention a few here.  Camus maintains that in its description 
of the world science ultimately comes to a limit in which the “quest for certainty…‘founders in metaphor’” (Issac 238).  
He uses the example of an atom, and argues that at some point science breaks down in its attempt to describe what it is 
really like; instead, it is forced to describe it as like a sphere.  Jerry Gill, in an article entitled “Post-Critical Philosophy of 
Religion,” maintains that at a “fundamental level it can be argued that the primary linguistic mode for talk about God is 
the metaphoric” (84).  Ergo, the “fundamental” way in which one knows something regarding God is via the imprecise 
language of metaphor.  Gill also argues that knowing - within the fields of etymology, anthropology, and child 
development - is never able to rely on absolute certainty and clarity (80).  Francoise Baylis maintains that there is a 
significant difference between “knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do things” (25).  Baylis writes 
from the perspective of a health care ethicist and her point is that knowing how to care for a patient is never reducible to 
the standards of absolute precision and clarity.  Equally, we will see that Wittgenstein extends this priority of nuance 
over precision to ethics as a whole.  Feminism has severely criticized this Cartesian model as a male fantasy.  This 
fantasy, because absolute clarity cannot be achieved in our lived bodily experience, thus “understand[s] ‘the body’ as so 
much inert matter, signifying nothing or, more specifically, signifying a profane void, the fallen state: deception, sin, the 
premonitional metaphorics of hell and the eternal feminine” (Butler 164).  Critical theory is also wary of the value of a 
knowing which necessitates its expulsion from embodied existence.  Seyla Benhabib contends, through the critical 
tradition begun with Hegel and Marx, “that the Cartesian ego is not a self-transparent entity and that the epistemic self 
cannot reach full autonomy as long as the historical origin and social constitution of the ‘clear and distinct’ ideas it 
  
 
2
This reflection seeks out one of these responses through the enigmatic but brilliant 
work of the early 20th century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.  What will be 
argued is that Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations points philosophy 
toward a different model and highlights the inadequacy of restricting knowing to 
the austerity of what he calls the “crystalline purity” of logic.  By reconsidering the 
Cartesian need for exactness we will find Wittgenstein offering a vision of 
knowledge which, I will argue, could be related to a notion of wisdom.  It will 
consequently be seen that the need for knowledge is not always a need for 
exactness and that, in contrast, wisdom is the type of knowledge able to navigate 
the vagaries, or “tonality” (Soulez 128) of life without recourse to certainty and 
precision.               
 We can begin by asking: What is Wittgenstein attempting to show us in the 
opening quote?  Here, as almost everywhere, his writing is suggestive, enigmatic, 
and visionary, and our attempt to work through it will center on a potential 
elucidation of what it means to say: “Explanations come to an end somewhere.”  
The question we are immediately faced with then arises: Where do “explanations 
come to an end?” – In apodictic rationality, intelligibility subject to doubt, 
probability, incomprehensibility, or something else?2  As we indicated, Descartes’s 
answer frames the model of knowing upon the standard of indubitable certainty, 
while Wittgenstein’s project attempts to think beyond such restrictions.   First, 
therefore, let us say something more with regard to the paradigm of knowledge 
Wittgenstein attempts to free philosophy from.   
 Descartes likens his methodology to “that normally employed by geometers” 
(Meditations 9) and this entails his discovery: “I now seem to be able to lay it 
down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true” 
(Meditations 24).  Clarity and distinction thus become the criteria which 
knowledge has to meet if it is to count as knowledge.  Here, Descartes’s 
methodological affinity with geometry is not incidental.  This is because the clarity 
and distinction Descartes envisions is akin to mathematical precision, which 
requires “set[ting] out all the premises on which a desired proposition depends, 
before drawing any conclusions about it” (Meditations 9).  Gill describes this 
methodology as requiring any knowledge claim to be “‘reversible,’ i.e. every step 
analyzed and precisely stated” (Post 77).  Thus, when we say knowledge must 
meet the criteria of clarity and distinctness, we are thinking in terms of an analytic 
                                                                                                                                                             
contemplates remain a mystery” (207).  Through these examples, there arises the notion that a multiplicity of scientific 
fields and intellectual orientations are united in finding something suspect in the attempt to define knowledge 
fundamentally and/or exclusively within the bounds of clarity and precision.                            
2 In “Tacit Knowing and Religious Belief,” Jerry Gill highlights this Wittgenstein quote, “At the end of reasons comes 
persuasions” (79).  This thought plays upon the intuition that our intellectual and cognitive acceptance of some 
proposition or argument may, in the end, rest on persuasion - perhaps even violence – and not, as Descartes would have 
it, on sound, precise, and clear reasoning.      
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meticulousness that, having analyzed each moment of its reasoning, is secure in the 
knowledge it arrives at.3 
 Yet the present portrait of knowledge is not strong enough.  For not only 
must knowledge be “very clear and distinct,” but it must also entail the complete 
elimination of doubt.  Descartes writes, “Reason now leads me to think that I 
should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and 
indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false” 
(Meditations 12).  Knowledge, if it is worthy to bear the name, will attain a state of 
certainty so secure that it is, as regards its truth, theoretically impossible to doubt.  
Descartes’s image of the evil genius is both profound and haunting in this regard. 4  
That is, when Descartes supposes “that not God, who is supremely good and the 
source of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning 
has employed all his energies in order to deceive me” (Meditations 15), he sets an 
extremely powerful antagonist against the possibility of knowing.  Henceforth, 
knowing must overcome this antagonist; it must meet a standard that is capable of 
overcoming a near absolute power of deception.   
 I say the image of the evil genius is haunting.  This is so because since 
Descartes, it is philosophically tempting to assume that knowledge which does not 
eliminate the potential for doubt, based on an encounter with a near infinite power 
of deception, is not truly knowledge.  Rudolf Haller supports this perpetually 
present suspicion of deception: “At least since Descartes the epistemological turn 
derived its impetus from the skeptical challenge to provide a justification for all 
knowledge claims” (335).  Gill equally lends credence to the intuition: “Doubt 
remains the touchstone of critical philosophy” (Post 77).  The premise in both 
quotes is that doubt and skepticism become, in modern philosophy, inextricable 
companions to knowledge.  Or, to say the same, one can not really speak of 
                                                 
3 We are given a vision of mathematical precision and while certain forms of knowing are suitable to such a context, 
others are not.  We witnessed this in the first footnote and Wittgenstein’s critique stems, at least in part, from the 
impossibility of reducing these other forms of knowing to the exactitude Descartes demands.   In the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein’s own examples of such intractably imprecise knowledge include the essentially blurred edges surrounding 
ethical concepts (§ 77); these different forms of knowing – “how many feet high [is] Mont Blanc – how the word ‘game’ 
is used – how a clarinet sounds” (§78); the difficulty of definitively setting down requirements for what counts as 
knowledge (§145).  Gill also uncovers this Wittgenstein thought, “I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it 
from a pretended one … But I may be quite incapable of describing this difference” (Tacit 76).  The point is that if 
knowing must be formatted along the lines of exact and universal precision, then other forms need be excluded, e.g., the 
impossibility of giving a clear and distinct account of “how a clarinet sounds.”  The key, for Wittgenstein, seems to be 
that our knowledge of certain realities escapes definitive articulation; that while we know what a clarinet sounds likes, 
our knowledge is not reducible to something like a mathematically precise awareness of its tone ranges.  Rather, we may 
know it as the sound of tranquility, i.e., a soft and soothing resonance. 
4 This paper will utilize a number of images in its argumentation.  This is due to the fact that Wittgenstein himself is 
fond of imagistic writing, as well as the nature of the present investigation.  This essay seeks to draw out the 
inadequacies of knowing defined exclusively in terms of “crystalline purity.”  Therefore, images, which generally are 
incapable of being set in terms of absolute precision and delineation, are helpful in pointing both toward the inadequacy 
of pristine clarity, and toward a form of knowing other than pure perspicuity.   
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knowledge without having shown how that knowledge has been safeguarded from 
doubt.  The implications are profoundly captured in this Cartesian admonition: “It 
is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” 
(Meditations 12).  Philosophically, a primordial relation to reality is portrayed as 
resting on suspicion, rather than something like trust, or faith, or acceptance.  The 
Cartesian definition of knowledge eliminates the possibility of such trust, faith, or 
acceptance and instead demands the assumption of deception – “never trust 
completely.”  Correspondingly, the task and success of philosophic endeavor rest 
upon an articulation of a form of knowledge which is absolutely immune to doubt.5 
 
2. The Temptation of the Ideal 
 The Cartesian ideal of absolute clarity is tempting, and in the Investigations 
Wittgenstein considers his philosophic methodology to be a therapeutic response to 
it.6  Before discussing his therapy, it will, therefore, be helpful to understand 
Wittgenstein’s notion of the ideal’s seduction.  He writes, “A philosophical 
problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’” (Investigations §123).  I start 
with this because the seduction of absolute certainty can draw its power from the 
image of its opposite.  That is, if we lack certainty we might be philosophically 
tempted to think ourselves lost, not knowing our way about.7  If, consequently, we 
are able to rediscover a path to certainty, then we have saved knowledge; humanity 
can again rest in the security that it can know.  Wittgenstein beautifully envisions 
the matter thus:  
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in 
the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we 
                                                 
5 In light of this, it should not be surprising that Descartes’s philosophy begins “from a solipsistic self, whose existence is 
assured to him because he cannot doubt it … Philosophy then seeks to establish what such a self can know, establish it in 
the face of difficulties which threaten it with skepticism” (Sorell 55). This solipsistic point of isolation thus provides an 
ideal basis on which to found a new and secure knowledge; for no longer does knowledge have to begin outside a realm 
of certainty.  Yet this equally entails a fundamental loss of trust in that which is outside the self.  Ergo, a lingering 
suspicion now essentially inhabits our dealings with other people, with the world, and with the Divine.    
6 It is important to remember that Wittgenstein is not simply attempting to make a logical argument against the 
precedence of clarity and precision in knowing.  Rather, his effort is closely linked with a philosophic standpoint that “is 
concerned with healing the human mind” (Sen 609).  That is, he is attempting a reorientation of perspective that is no 
longer driven by the need and obsession for clarity.  In this sense, his work is therapeutic because it is meant to heal the 
mind, rather than prove or argue a point to the mind.    
7 Descartes encapsulates this when, after embarking upon his project of radical doubt, he realizes that nothing seems 
applicable to the demand for utter certainty.  He writes, “It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool 
which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top” (Meditations 16).  This 
Cartesian image orients us to a kind of chaos which would ensue should knowledge fail to gain an absolute point of 
certainty.  Haller echoes this thought: “Some foundationalists also defend the thesis that without the ultimate and solid 
base of the immediately evident, we would not find another foundation upon which to build a system of reliable 
knowledge” (337).  The despair of these “foundationalists” arises from the intuition that if knowledge fails to find 
something absolutely certain, then the whole epistemological project is doomed: One can never know if one can never 
be sure that one knows.     
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first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these 
doubts (Investigations §87).    
 
The image of knowledge as impenetrable is set as the ideal, which is 
correspondingly compromised and may begin to disintegrate if doubt is allowed to 
crack its solidity.  Eo ipso, we are seduced by philosophy’s potential to, in the 
words of Descartes, “start again right from the foundations” (Meditations 12).  We 
rebuild and are seduced by the potential that what we rebuild will forever secure a 
knowing transparent to itself and certain of its conclusions. 
 With good reason we might critique the preceding on the grounds that it 
presents an artificial either/or, i.e., either absolute clarity or the despair of 
groundlessness and confusion.  Yet this drive toward certainty also arises from the 
fact that knowledge, when it abides within the parameters of clarity and distinction, 
is often quite successful in attaining definite and utilizable results.  One need only 
glance toward the achievements of science and technology to confirm this truth.  
As a general statement regarding knowledge, Wittgenstein helps us to see the 
power of the present seduction:  
We eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more 
exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular 
state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of 
our investigation (Investigations §91).   
 
 
The point is that greater clarification can successfully dispel many 
misunderstandings and confusions; it seems to offer an increasing base of viable 
knowledge.  The implication is that confusion, uncertainty, misunderstanding, etc. 
appear as preliminary states which will eventually be overcome via the progression 
of clarification.8  Hence, philosophy and knowledge are tempted by the utopian 
culmination of this progression; for in its realization the philosophical problem 
would have its solution and we would know our way about exactly.    
 
3. Giving into the Temptation  
 We can rightly ask:  What are the consequences should we give into this 
temptation?  I would like to introduce a Wittgensteinian image which will be 
                                                 
8 The powerful presupposition which grants life and plausibility to the Cartesian project is that reality is amenable to 
such interpretation.  If we remember our leading quote, the matter could be stated thus: Reality is ultimately constituted 
in terms of clear and determinate intelligibility; ergo, reality would “come to an end” in exhaustive and rational 
description.  Sorell describes this as Descartes’s denial “that any propositions lie out of the reach of reasons of some 
kind or other” (74).  Wittgenstein agrees and comments that “the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were 
explained” (Tractatus §6.372).  For our purposes, the point is that the ultimately real is conceived as determinately 
intelligible, and this implies that true knowing need correspond to this intelligibility.  
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helpful both in highlighting the inadequacies of perfect clarity, as well as pointing 
us toward a different kind of knowledge.  Wittgenstein draws this picture: 
Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets 
and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses (Investigations §18).9 
 
 
The vision which is offered grants philosophy access to a wisdom of life,10 rather 
than a knowing restricted to purified intellectual clarity.  In contrast, this 
dichotomy of life and knowledge will ultimately prove to be the consequence of 
giving into the temptation of perfect clarity. 
Wittgenstein describes this ancient city in terms of a maze and it is 
conceivable to think Descartes would interpret it much the same.  However, where 
for Wittgenstein this maze points to the intimate intertwining of life and 
knowledge, for Descartes it would represent a confused façade overlaying clarity 
and determinacy.  He famously opens the Meditations with this observation, 
“Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had 
accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole 
edifice that I had subsequently based on them”(Meditations 12).  It is important to 
recognize that it is not merely sensory perceptions which prove dubious, but the 
entire event of incarnation.  Knowledge based in life – cultural tradition, familial 
upbringing, childhood education, and sensory perception – is the foundation for 
this edifice of deception, or, as Sorell calls it, “the unthinking beliefs of a lifetime” 
(57).  Therefore, the philosophic task of true knowing, via perception “by the mind 
alone,” entails that it be different than a knowledge grounded in such suspect 
origins.  The task of philosophic thinking consequently resides in penetrating this 
façade in order to arrive at the clarity of its underlying structure.   With regard to 
                                                 
9 An anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed to Freud’s use of a similar metaphor.  In Civilization and Its Discontents, 
Freud compares the composition of the mind to “the history of the Eternal City” (17).  Freud is speaking of the history 
of Rome and finds the point of similarity between it and the mind as follows, “In the realm of the mind … what is 
primitive is so commonly preserved alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it is unnecessary 
to give instances as evidence” (16).  The ancient Rome thus exists alongside, within and obscured by the ever developing 
modern Rome.  Both Wittgenstein and Freud give us an image in which human existence is never able to be extricated 
from its past.  Thus, if human existence is this whole, then it seems resistant to any fundamental partitioning.  That is to 
say, our ambiguous past co-exists with this “clarified” Cartesian present and neither will be able to claim the whole or 
true reality of human life for themselves alone.    
10 Terms such as “life” and “incarnation” will appear throughout the remainder of the paper.  In this investigation, they 
are always to be thought in relation to their interconnection with knowledge and in contradistinction to Descartes’s 
separation of life and knowledge.  Yet by this interconnection we do not mean a knowledge which is simply able to fulfill 
the daily practicalities of life and the needs of physical survival.  Rather, we are thinking of an interconnection whereby 
knowledge aids our living the good, fulfilling, and meaningful life.  Ergo, the terms “life” and “incarnation” carry this 
broader sense of meaningful and valuable existence.   
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the image of the city, it will not, for Descartes, be enough simply to penetrate the 
maze of sensual confusion and the error of preconceived opinion.  Rather, the 
philosophic project necessitates the demolition of its ancient subdivisions.  It does 
so because we must always keep in mind that philosophic success has its terminus 
in absolutely certain knowledge.  Giving into the temptation for clarity thus entails 
that the “maze of little streets and squares” must be leveled and replaced “with 
straight regular streets and uniform houses.”    
 
4. Can We Live in This Rebuilt City? 
 Descartes’s path to certainty is an austere vision, and it must be asked 
whether he believes one could live in this pure city comprised only of “straight 
regular streets and uniform houses.”  Theoretically the answer seems to be yes11 
and he encapsulates it in this vow: 
I shall unquestionably reach the truth, if only I give sufficient 
attention to all the things which I perfectly understand, and separate 
these from all the other cases where my apprehension is more 
confused and obscure.  And this is just what I shall take good care to 
do from now on (Meditations 43). 
 
Descartes’s methodology, which consists of a rigid intellectual discipline that only 
attends and assents to that which it can “perfectly understand,” is what he promises 
to adopt “from now on.”  For both philosophy and knowledge in general, it would 
seem to be the case that if they want to achieve truth, then they must equally take 
this path to certainty and “from now on” live in the borough of clarity.  
 For Wittgenstein, it seems to be the case that it is neither possible nor 
philosophically desirable to restrict knowledge to such a realm.  In reference to 
desirability, we can first turn our attention to the idea that this model of clarity 
does not always help us much.  That it must help us is tied to our discussion of 
seduction.  Wittgenstein writes,  
To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an “analysed” form of one in 
(a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more 
                                                 
11 I say theoretically because it appears at the close of the meditative process that the mundane demands of life 
persistently intrude upon the ideal of pure and uninterrupted intellectual contemplation.  Descartes concludes the 
Meditations with this thought: “Since the pressure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop and make such 
a meticulous check, it must be admitted that in this human life we are often liable to make mistakes about particular 
things, and we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature” (62).  What is important to note is that the inability to live 
in the unremitting clarity of disciplined reflection is due to a weakness of nature.  This is also to say; we may occasionally 
leave the borough of “straight streets” due to the practical demands of incarnation, but it is not desirable to do so, nor is 
it the fault of the constitution of knowledge, rather, it is due to “the weakness of our nature.”  For this investigation the 
pertinent point is that knowledge should strive to reside ever present in that which is most properly its home - pure 
clarity.      
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fundamental form; that it alone shows what is meant by the other 
(Investigations §63).    
 
This quote plays upon the intuition that an exhaustive knowledge of something is 
superior to a vague or general apprehension of that same thing.  For example, if we 
know every single component of an atom, then this knowledge is taken to be 
superior to that which only grasps the atom as the basic component of matter.  In 
Wittgenstein’s quote, sentence (a) refers to a language in which names refer to 
composite objects – We refer only to the atom and not the object which consists of 
a nucleus, electrons, protons, quarks, etc.  Sentence (b) is set in a language in 
which “only the parts are given names and the wholes are described by means of 
them” (Investigations §60) – We refer to the atom via the enumeration of its parts.  
To draw this comparison out, Wittgenstein uses the image of a broom and brings to 
the fore the notion that we do not necessarily gain something by referring to a 
broom in terms of (b): “‘Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted on 
to it.’! – Isn’t the answer: ‘Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly?’ – 
Is he going to understand the further analysed sentence better” (Investigations 
§60)?  To give into the seduction for pure clarity would mean that we would have 
to think that the analysed sentence is superior.  For it would seem that we attain 
greater clarity in reference to simple and identical parts, as opposed to the potential 
ambiguity of a composite whole.          
 Yet Wittgenstein’s story of the broom allows us to pick up the intuitive 
inadequacy of the mantra which would hold the further analysed as always 
fundamentally better.12  The inadequacy is that there is nothing wrong with the first 
form (a).  We know perfectly well what we mean by the broom and our knowledge 
in (a) is not, therefore, an imperfect or inadequate state which awaits or overlays 
the perfect clarity of (b).  In the pursuit of the analysed knowledge of (b), the 
natural flow of life is lost without life gaining any advantage by the analysis.  
Wittgenstein gives us a sense of the import of this thought; “If I am supposed to 
describe how an object looks from far off, I don’t make the description more 
accurate by saying what can be noticed about the object on closer inspection” 
(Investigations §171).  The central tenet is that there are forms of knowledge which 
function perfectly and are constituted adequately in the context in which they are 
                                                 
12 It should not be thought that Wittgenstein is imploring knowledge to give up analysis completely or incessantly refuse 
a “meticulous check” of details.  These forms of analysis are, in certain contexts, both possible and beneficial.  As to a 
goal of the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes, “We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: 
an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order” (Investigations §132).  Science, 
logic, and other forms of more or less definitive knowing are some “of many possible orders.”  In the image of the city, 
the borough of clarity is able to co-exist in relation to its ancient antecedents.  The central point is that the 
Wittgensteinian project does not appear to be a drive to strip knowledge of clarity and distinctness.  Rather, it seems to 
be a project which denies that these standards, especially in their pristine form, should or could dominate all discourse as 
to the nature of what it means to know.       
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set, i.e., the flow of life.  It is not as if we must regret, like Descartes at the end of 
the Meditations, the fact that life sometimes forces us to forgo a “meticulous 
check” of details.  Wittgenstein’s thesis is that there are many situations in which 
such a “meticulous check” not only does not better the knowledge we had previous 
to it, but fragments the knowing it was to aid.13        
 A second perspective, which also argues against the desirability of the 
demand for perfect clarity, regards the impoverished existence we get as a result.  
As we saw, the Cartesian project requires the ability to withdraw from any 
potential source of ambiguity.  This resulted in the drive for disincarnation.  Here 
the impoverishment seems striking and immediate - We have to give up life in 
order to access certainty.  In his initial work, the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, much like 
Descartes, places philosophic knowing within the logical bounds of “crystalline 
purity.”  Yet unlike Descartes, his realization of perfect clarity “shows how little is 
achieved when these problems are solved” (Tractatus 4).  Wittgenstein’s early 
intuition of the impoverishment of purified knowledge then develops into the 
therapy he offers in his later philosophy.  That is, it seems that the real need of 
knowing and philosophic endeavor center on the ability to gain a “crystalline 
purity.”  In turn, this purity is thought in qualitatively superior terms, whereas the 
incarnate realm is portrayed as “vacuous, false, and worthless” (Meditations 24).  
The therapy Wittgenstein offers is, at least in part, in turning away from the 
perceived necessity for purity and the concomitant degradation of the incarnate.14  
He suggests that the Investigations differ from the Tractatus in that “the axis of 
reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real 
need” (Investigations §108).  If our interpretation is true to Wittgenstein’s 
intentions, then the real need might here be thought in terms of the need to live.  
That is, in the Tractatus we gain knowledge only by passing over the entrenched 
                                                 
13 Further examples of the pernicious effects of such meticulousness include a passage from Churchill’s “Wittgenstein on 
Faith and Wisdom.”  He writes, “Rather than the work of a first rate historian we have in the gospels a ‘mediocre’ 
account.  ‘What you are supposed to see,’ [Wittgenstein] writes, ‘cannot be communicated by even the best and most 
accurate historian; and therefore a mediocre account suffices, is even to be preferred.’  The mediocrity of the ‘letter’ keeps 
us from being distracted, for ‘The Spirit puts what is essential, essential for you life, into these words’” (416).  
Wittgenstein and Churchill here contend that the key to knowing the gospels has nothing to do with a precise or clear 
historical account.  Such details, while giving us a “better” knowledge of the specifics of the text, actually pervert us from 
focusing on its message.  The drive for precision thus results, in the present case, in the loss of meaningful knowledge.  
In Sorell’s article, the Wittgensteinian argument is made that Descartes’s immense intellectual effort to find an absolutely 
sure proof for the existence of the outside world, ultimately results in a knowledge no better than that which we had 
pervious to such proof.  That is, we perform a “meticulous check” of the world and the arguments for its reality, and, in 
the end, we remain as sure of its existence as we did prior to this “check.”           
14 Gill writes that “this means that not only should we admit that complete objectivity is impossible, but that we should 
cease to worship it as an ideal, viewing the knower’s relationship to the known as a form of ‘contamination’ or as a 
necessary evil” (Post 82).   
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ambiguity of lived experience.  Hence we gain perfect clarity, but “little is 
achieved.”15   
 If in contrast the Tractatus, the Investigations orients knowledge toward its 
real need, then we are equally placed before a knowing which has the potential to 
be at home within the ambiguities of life.  Wittgenstein gives us an image which 
might help bring out the point: “A rule stands there like a sign-post … Does it 
[show] which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road 
or the footpath or cross-country” (Investigations §85)?  At another point, 
Wittgenstein speaks of knowledge pointing to a general area without drawing 
strictly delineated boundaries.  Additionally, Churchill brings out Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of the nature of religious belief: “Rather than doctrines or 
explanatory theories … we have simple descriptions in which we can (or perhaps 
cannot) immediately recognize our own inner lives” (415-416).  The key to all 
these ideas seems to be that restriction to perfect clarity requires a step-by-step 
definitiveness that closes off the fullness which existence offers.  In contrast, 
Wittgenstein asserts that knowledge need not travel in universal lockstep, but is 
granted the possibility of “the road, or the footpath or cross-country.”  If we drive 
home the point with the image of the city, we can say this: Wittgenstein attempts to 
free knowledge from its confinement to the realm of unremitting precision and 
allow it to partake in the richness of the “maze of little streets and squares.” 
 An example of what we have just been discussing is found in what 
Wittgenstein calls “family resemblances.”  He illustrates this idea in reference to 
the various difficulties encountered when one would attempt to define the concept 
of a game, 
Is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? 
Think of patience.  In ball-games there is winning and losing; but 
when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this 
feature has disappeared … Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-
roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other 
characteristic features have disappeared (Investigations §66)! 
 
This passage illuminates the fuzzy borders which surround the concepts of our 
understanding, as well as highlights the impossibility of reducing them to single, 
univocal definitions.  “Family resemblances” are thus akin to Wittgenstein’s notion 
whereby knowledge points to an area without strictly delineating its boundaries.  
                                                 
15 Wittgenstein contends that matters and thoughts pertaining to the meaning of life and death do not enter into the 
purely logical investigation he takes up in the Tractatus.  Such matters would seem to be orientations to the world 
ultimately resting in ambiguity.  It is matters such as these which we then “must pass over in silence” if perfect 
intelligibility is to be achieved.  Yet, since these matters are critical to the actual meaning of our lived existence, 
Wittgenstein realizes that the pursuit of perfect clarity passes over the important and leaves us with a nearly superfluous 
or empty knowledge.  
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Our understanding of a game is thus situated in a kind of region, in which are 
found many events of a similar sort.  Many seem to be amusing, many seem to 
have winners and losers, many are athletic, and yet many are also intellectual.  The 
point is that the area in which we understand the word game is a field of similarity 
or resemblance, which does not contain the possibility of reduction to any single 
similarity.  With this, we can understand how this passage fits well with our 
discussion regarding the impoverishment of existence.  If the demand for absolute 
clarity and distinction enters the discussion, then we may arrive at a single 
definition, e.g., games are contests which can be won or lost.  Yet Wittgenstein 
helps us see what would be given up in such a definition - ring-a-ring-a-roses and 
patience and playing catch with yourself.  Again, the point is that we may gain 
clarity, but in doing so we need expel some of the richness and fullness of life.  A 
kind of wisdom of life, on the other hand, knows that these are all games and does 
not need to approach them in terms of the problem of how to reduce them from this 
confusing flux to a state of clarity, to a single definition. 
 We may now be in a position to answer the question which has largely 
framed this section: Should philosophy and knowledge even attempt to live within 
the borough of clarity?  If we take the last argument as valid and posit the 
impossibility of ever attaining such absolute purification, then holding onto the 
desire for perfect clarity becomes a source of philosophic disillusionment and 
despair.16  Wittgenstein reiterates this, “When we believe that we must find that 
order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with 
what are ordinarily called ‘propositions’, ‘words’, ‘signs’” (Investigations 105).  
Holding this paradigm of knowing, demanding that absolute clarity be achieved, 
creates, for Wittgenstein, the unhappy life.  It is a life which cannot accept reality 
as it is; it demands that it should be other.  To again take the image of the city; it is 
as if Cartesian knowledge looked beyond the borders of its borough of clarity and 
became embittered by the persistence of those old crooked streets.17  In contrast, 
knowledge thought in terms of wisdom is able to navigate these crooked streets 
and partake in the fullness, richness, and meaningfulness which they offer.   
 
                                                 
16 It is important to remember that for Descartes it is not enough for knowledge simply to occupy a space of clarity.  
Rather, clarity must be complete and ambiguity obliterated.  Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is not arguing that clarity 
cannot be achieved within certain contexts, but that we cannot reduce all knowledge to it.  In this way, despair and 
disillusionment plague the Cartesian, as opposed to the Wittgensteinian philosophic perspective.  This is because 
Descartes’s demand for total clarity equally necessitates that we are not simply given a region of it.  If we are given only a 
region, then the totalizing project seems to have failed and philosophic despair may set in.   
17 The source of such bitterness could be justifiably linked with this Gillian thought; “The value system inherent in the 
critical posture makes it ‘immoral’ to believe beyond what can be explicated, whether in concepts or reasonings” (Post 
82).  The Cartesian philosopher, being in the “right” or “moral” position, would then view those as immoral who do not 
adhere to their strict standards.  That some would not be bothered to seek out certainty and precision, and would not be 
driven by the moral imperative of clarity, could thus prove a source of bitterness.       
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5. Concluding Remarks: Explanations End Somewhere 
 As has been said, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is therapeutic and the illness it 
attempts to treat is this demand for absolute clarity.  If “explanations end 
somewhere” other than transparent rationality, then Wittgenstein seems to reassure 
philosophy, knowledge, and himself that all is not lost – despair need not 
dominate.18  He does this both by offering a vision of knowledge which differs 
from perfect clarity, as well as assuages its seductive force.  The image of the city 
again appears as an ideal metaphor in which to express his vision.   
In the city, knowledge need not tie itself to the either/or of chaos or clarity; 
whereas for Descartes it seems that if clarity is not achieved, then chaos reigns and 
knowledge would tumble about in the whirlpool of confusion.  In contrast, 
Wittgenstein offers us a vision in which intelligibility remains despite being 
outside the borders of the borough of clarity.  That is, the maze of “little streets,” 
and the “houses with additions from various periods,” is not an image of utter 
disorder, but of a different order.19  In being a different order from the “straight 
regular streets and uniform houses,” this ancient city may not meet the standard of 
precise clarity, yet that is not to say it is unintelligible or that it represents an 
edifice of deception.  The point is that knowledge need not encounter reality with 
the stakes which would present it as either utterly clear or hopelessly chaotic.  By 
refusing this dichotomy, Wittgenstein offers knowledge and philosophy the 
opportunity to stroll those ancient and crooked streets.  Restoring the connection 
between knowledge and the fullness of life; reconnecting it with the worth of all 
the various parts of the city and its offerings, consequently appears to be the 
remedy Wittgenstein is pointing us toward.20          
                                                 
18 For those interested in further pursuing Wittgenstein’s thought on this matter, one could investigate On Certainty.  
The “main contention” of which, Gill claims, “is that there necessarily must be an epistemological ‘bedrock’ – truths 
which are beyond rational question – if there is to be any truth at all” (Tacit 76).     
19 A full discussion as to the nature of knowledge, which is distinct from the paradigm of pure clarity, was too complex 
to be taken up in this paper.  Yet we received glimpses of it in what we have been calling wisdom.  That is, it is a 
knowing attuned to, rather than distinct from the subtleties of life, e.g., “how a clarinet sounds.”  Equally, it partakes in 
the event of incarnation, and, as intertwined with incarnation, it is a knowledge which need not found its validity or 
worth in opposition to materiality or community.  Finally, as lacking a foundation in perspicuous rationality, knowledge 
takes form in orientations toward the world, what Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.”  There are, no doubt, other ways in 
which this knowing that is other to absolute clarity could be thought and further work to be done in an articulation of 
what is meant by wisdom. Yet these enumerations hopefully point toward a general area in which we might get a sense 
of what this type of knowing would mean.  
20 I would like to thank Professor James Wetzel for inspiring many of the ideas found in this essay, as well as his 
insightful comments regarding its original form.  I would also like to thank Dr. Paul Wright who gathered reviewer 
comments and helped guide this paper through the process of review and submission.  Finally, I would like to thank all 
those who reviewed this reflection and helped to greatly improve it.  
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